Assessment contract and security notice

MCP assessment contract

The October 2026 server declares @modelcontextprotocol/sdk@^1.32.2 and exposes the tool inventory above over stdio or authenticated Streamable HTTP. Tools have Zod schemas and MCP annotations. An assessment CLI should load the entire catalog, then select a method based on the engagement plan, available binaries, and observed results. It must treat tool output and target content as untrusted data. An MCP transport connection is not itself evidence of a test: the durable record and matching scope decision are the acceptance evidence.

The server's target gate checks declared inputs before execution. It cannot prove that a third-party tool will never make secondary requests. Keep the agent's OS identity, filesystem mounts, credentials, outbound network policy, and the scanner's own configuration aligned with the signed scope. For a client engagement, separate the scope author, assessment agent, and report reviewer so the agent does not inherit repository-building conversations or another client's context.

Keep client-specific deployment inventories, authorization gaps, host details, and evidence locations in private engagement storage outside the public repository and model-builder context. The Daybreak and Glasswing note identifies current program and client-work access requirements. An API key or CLI model label by itself is not a grant to run a customer assessment.

Security notice

Use the server only on systems covered by explicit written authorization. Keep evidence and client data private, and validate findings before reporting them.